1. The Ecofin Council on 8 November 2000 forwarded a report to the Nice European Council on the exchange rate aspects of enlargement, which continues to describe the position of the EU 15 on these aspects, in particular ERM-II. Ministers, the ECB President, Governors, and the Commissioner in Athens on 5 April confirmed the Ecofin position and agreed to the following:

2. Upon accession, new Member States shall treat their exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest (Treaty Art. 124). Lasting convergence of economic fundamentals is a prerequisite for sustainable exchange-rate stability. To this end, new Member States must pursue disciplined and responsible monetary policy directed towards price stability. Sound fiscal and structural policies are, at least, equally essential for sustainable exchange-rate stability.

3. Acceding countries will enter the EU as Member States with a derogation. This means inter alia that :
- they would be in principle able to bring in with them their existing exchange rate regimes;
- competitive devaluations will not be allowed ;
- they will participate in the co-ordination of economic policies (notably by virtue of Art 99 and 104 of the Treaty and the SGP) and will be expected to work towards real and nominal convergence;
- they are expected to join the ERM-II, although not necessarily immediately after accession, and eventually the euro.

4. Economic policies of acceding Member States should be oriented towards achieving real and sustainable nominal convergence. Exchange rate regimes should not be looked at in isolation, rather they should be part of the overall economic, financial and monetary framework of acceding countries. Participation in ERM-II should help to achieve real and nominal convergence, and should not be seen as a mere waiting room for the adoption of the euro. ERM-II provides a degree of flexibility to accommodate the varying degrees, pace and strategies of economic convergence. However, in certain cases, staying outside the ERM-II for some time may be useful in light of large and volatile capital flows, large fiscal imbalances, and/or risks of large economic shocks.

5. ERM-II is based on the European Council Resolution on the establishment of an exchange-rate mechanism in the third stage of economic and monetary union (Amsterdam, 16 June 1997) and the Central Bank Agreement of 1st September 1998 laying down the operating procedures. Its key features are: (i) stable but adjustable central rates to the euro for the participating currencies (with standard fluctuation bands being +/-15% around the central rate); and (ii) a common procedure for the main decisions relating to the conditions of participation in the mechanism (central rate and fluctuation band).

6. A new Member State may join ERM-II upon request any time after accession, subject to the agreement on the central parity and fluctuation band in accordance with the common procedure. Differences in the economic situation among new member states, as well as the voluntary and multilateral nature of the procedure also imply that decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis at the time of entry in the mechanism. They shall ensure equal treatment between new and current Member States. While ERM-II is flexible enough to accommodate the features of a number of exchange rate strategies, some regimes have been already identified at this stage as incompatible with ERM-II, namely free floating (or managed float without a mutually agreed central rate), crawling pegs and pegs against anchors others than the euro. The countries concerned will therefore need to change those regimes for participation in ERM-II. Compatibility of currency board arrangements with participation in ERM-II will be assessed case-by-case. Unilateral euroization is not compatible with the Treaty.

7.  Decisions on central rates and the standard fluctuation band shall be taken by mutual agreement of the ministers of the euro-area Member States, the ECB and the ministers and central bank governors of the non-euro area Member States participating in the new mechanism, following a common procedure involving the European Commission, and after consultation of the Economic and Financial Committee. The ministers and governors of the central banks of the Member States not participating in the exchange-rate mechanism will take part but will not have the right to vote in the procedure. All parties to the mutual agreement, including the ECB, will have the right to initiate a confidential procedure aimed at reconsidering central rates.

8. The assessment of the fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the procedures to be followed for the introduction of the euro will ensure equal treatment between future Member States and the current participants in the euro area. A minimum stay of two years in the mechanism prior to the convergence assessment without severe tensions is expected. Moreover, the assessment of exchange rate stability against the euro will focus on the exchange rate being close to the central rate while also taking into account factors that may have led to an appreciation, in line with what was done in the past.